Why the Direct Argument Does Not Shift the Burden of Proof
[Penultimate Draft]
The Journal of Philosophy, 113 (4): 2016
Peter van Inwagen's highly influential Direct Argument (DA) for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism makes use of an inference rule he calls "Rule B." Michael McKenna has argued that van Inwagen's defense of this rule is dialectically inappropriate because it is based entirely on alleged “confirming” cases that are not of the right kind to justify the use of Rule B in DA. Here I argue that McKenna’s objection is on the right track but more must be said if we are to see why. To fill in the gaps I consider a recent attempt by Ira M. Schnall and David Widerker to defend DA against McKenna’s objection. I argue that neither prong of their attack is successful against a variation on McKenna’s basic argument. In the course of responding to Schnall and Widerker’s objections to McKenna, I identify what is, as I argue, the real reason DA fails in its purpose to shift the burden of proof.
Peter van Inwagen's highly influential Direct Argument (DA) for the incompatibility of moral responsibility and causal determinism makes use of an inference rule he calls "Rule B." Michael McKenna has argued that van Inwagen's defense of this rule is dialectically inappropriate because it is based entirely on alleged “confirming” cases that are not of the right kind to justify the use of Rule B in DA. Here I argue that McKenna’s objection is on the right track but more must be said if we are to see why. To fill in the gaps I consider a recent attempt by Ira M. Schnall and David Widerker to defend DA against McKenna’s objection. I argue that neither prong of their attack is successful against a variation on McKenna’s basic argument. In the course of responding to Schnall and Widerker’s objections to McKenna, I identify what is, as I argue, the real reason DA fails in its purpose to shift the burden of proof.
Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified 'Would'-Counterfactuals are Not True
[Penultimate Draft]
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 99(3): 2021
The apparent consistency of Sobel sequences (example below) famously motivated David Lewis to defend a variably strict conditional semantics for counterfactuals.
a. If Sophie had gone to the parade she would have seen Pedro.
b. If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall she would not have seen Pedro.
But if the order of the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence is reversed – in the example, if (b) is asserted prior to (a) – the second counterfactual asserted no longer rings true. This is the Heim sequence problem. That the order of assertion makes this difference is surprising on the variably strict account. Some argue that this is reason to reject the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics outright. Others argue that the problem motivates a contextualist rendering of counterfactuals. Still others maintain that the explanation for the phenomenon is merely pragmatic. I argue that none of these are right, and defend a novel way to understand the phenomenon. My proposal avoids the problems faced by the alternative analyses and enjoys independent support. There is, however, a difficulty for my view: it entails that many ordinarily-accepted counterfactuals are not true. I argue that this (apparent) cost is acceptable.
a. If Sophie had gone to the parade she would have seen Pedro.
b. If Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall she would not have seen Pedro.
But if the order of the counterfactuals in a Sobel sequence is reversed – in the example, if (b) is asserted prior to (a) – the second counterfactual asserted no longer rings true. This is the Heim sequence problem. That the order of assertion makes this difference is surprising on the variably strict account. Some argue that this is reason to reject the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics outright. Others argue that the problem motivates a contextualist rendering of counterfactuals. Still others maintain that the explanation for the phenomenon is merely pragmatic. I argue that none of these are right, and defend a novel way to understand the phenomenon. My proposal avoids the problems faced by the alternative analyses and enjoys independent support. There is, however, a difficulty for my view: it entails that many ordinarily-accepted counterfactuals are not true. I argue that this (apparent) cost is acceptable.
Should We Be Skeptics or Contextualists About Counterfactual Conditionals?
[Penultimate Draft]
Philosophy Compass (2021)
Just as knowledge contextualism offers a way out of knowledge skepticism in the face of powerful skeptical arguments, counterfactual contextualism purports to answer the many compelling arguments for the skeptical thesis that most ordinary counterfactuals of the form ‘if A had happened, C would have happened’, are false. In this article I review a few of the arguments for counterfactual skepticism, before surveying the various types of contextualist responses. I then discuss some of the recent objections to counterfactual contextualism, with an eye toward weighing contextualism’s costs with the costs of accepting skepticism. I conclude by remarking on some of the implications that skepticism and contextualism each has for many disputes in metaphysics.
Morgenbesser's Coin
[Penultimate Draft]
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(5): 2021
Before a fair, indeterministic coin is tossed, Lucky, who is causally isolated from the coin tossing mechanism, is offered the chance to bet on heads. Lucky declines. The coin lands heads. Consider the following counterfactual.
M: If Lucky had bet heads he would have won.
The consensus is that M is true. It is also widely believed that in order to be able to rule M true, any plausible semantics for counterfactuals must invoke causal independence (call the thesis that the semantics for counterfactuals must appeal to causal independence the causal independence thesis). But if our semantics for counterfactuals must appeal to causal notions, the Humean hope of giving a reductive analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals is undermined.
Here I argue that there is no good reason to believe that M is true, and that in fact, there is compelling reason to believe that it is false. In addition, I demonstrate that when the causal independence thesis is understood as it should be, it entails that many unequivocally false counterfactuals are true. Therefore, the causal independence thesis should be rejected.
M: If Lucky had bet heads he would have won.
The consensus is that M is true. It is also widely believed that in order to be able to rule M true, any plausible semantics for counterfactuals must invoke causal independence (call the thesis that the semantics for counterfactuals must appeal to causal independence the causal independence thesis). But if our semantics for counterfactuals must appeal to causal notions, the Humean hope of giving a reductive analysis of causation in terms of counterfactuals is undermined.
Here I argue that there is no good reason to believe that M is true, and that in fact, there is compelling reason to believe that it is false. In addition, I demonstrate that when the causal independence thesis is understood as it should be, it entails that many unequivocally false counterfactuals are true. Therefore, the causal independence thesis should be rejected.
Against the Standard Solution to the Grandfather Paradox
[Penultimate Draft]
Forthcoming, Synthese
1000 time-travelers travel back in time, each with the intention of killing his or her own infant-self. If there is no branching time, then on pain of bringing about a logical contradiction, all must fail. But this seems inexplicable: what is to ensure that the time-travelers are stopped?
For a time, this inexplicability objection was thought to provide evidence that there is something incoherent about the possibility of backwards time travel in a universe without branching time. There is now near-consensus, however, that the objection has no bite: there is nothing inexplicable about the mass failure. Lewis, Sider and Ismael independently argue that since it is built into the description of the class of cases considered that the time-travelers must fail, and so we consider only unsuccessful attempts, there is no mystery. Smith argues that the absence of possible worlds at which auto-infanticide is committed suffices as a complete explanation for the failures. And Baron and Colyvan maintain that available causal and logical explanations jointly account for everything that needs accounting for.
I argue that these are wrong. There is remaining, problematic inexplicability. For backwards time travel not to lead to logical contradiction, something would need to do logic’s bidding, after all.
For a time, this inexplicability objection was thought to provide evidence that there is something incoherent about the possibility of backwards time travel in a universe without branching time. There is now near-consensus, however, that the objection has no bite: there is nothing inexplicable about the mass failure. Lewis, Sider and Ismael independently argue that since it is built into the description of the class of cases considered that the time-travelers must fail, and so we consider only unsuccessful attempts, there is no mystery. Smith argues that the absence of possible worlds at which auto-infanticide is committed suffices as a complete explanation for the failures. And Baron and Colyvan maintain that available causal and logical explanations jointly account for everything that needs accounting for.
I argue that these are wrong. There is remaining, problematic inexplicability. For backwards time travel not to lead to logical contradiction, something would need to do logic’s bidding, after all.
Reasons-Responsiveness, Control and the Negligence Puzzle
Forthcoming, Philosophical Issues
A longstanding puzzle about moral responsibility for negligence arises from three plausible yet jointly inconsistent theses: (i) an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for some outcome O, even if her behavior with respect to O is negligent (i.e., even if she never adverted to the possibility that the behavior might result in O), (ii) an agent can be morally responsible for O only if she has some control over O, (iii) if an agent acts negligently with respect to O, then she has no control over O.
This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons-responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason-responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons-responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios, then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons-responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right – and each can help solve the negligence puzzle.
This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons-responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason-responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons-responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios, then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons-responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right – and each can help solve the negligence puzzle.